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INTRODUCTION: INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND STATE FAILURE 
Since the early modern era, the sovereign state has been promoted as the 
normative unit of interstate relations by political philosophers and international jurists 
alike. Some scholars trace its origins to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia.1 Others, such as 
Stephen Krasner, point out that state sovereignty was not formally articulated until the 
Swiss jurist Emmerich de Vattel’s 1758 work The Law of Nations or Principles of the 
Law of Nature Applies to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns.2 In both 
cases, it is accepted that the system of sovereign states evolved out of early modern 
Europe and that by the end of that period (e.g. the age of enlightenment), it was the 
ubiquitous system of European interstate relations and, by extension, of global politics. 
The rise of state sovereignty was brought about by the shift of European powers away 
from decentralized feudalism and toward centralized monarchy. This shift had enormous 
repercussions for the European military landscape. No longer were wars small and 
frequent events between feudal lords, their knights and serf levies, but were instead less 
frequent inter-state confrontations, vastly greater in scale, between the large standing 
armies of bureaucratically-centralized monarchies.3 Equipping and maintaining these 
standing forces with weapons of increasing technological complexity and cost placed 
new burdens on the state thereby necessitating improvements in extractive capacity.  
Charles Tilly theorized that democracy and liberal-capitalism both gained 
prominence during this period because these institutions allowed sovereigns to extract 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Robert Jackson, “Sovereignty in World Politics: A Glance at the Conceptual and Historical Landscape,” 
Political Studies 47 (1999), 438-439. 
2  Steven D. Krasner, “Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States,” 
International Security 29, no. 2, (Autumn, 2004), 87.n3. 
3 V.G. Kiernan, “State and Nation in Western Europe,” Past and Present 31 (July, 1965), 20-38. 
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more resources than were available under direct authoritarian rule.4 This provided for the 
centralization of standing armies under absolute monarchy as well as the rise of lavish 
court life.5 It also provided for the development of a bourgeois public sphere.6 The 
sovereign state system, then, fostered modern democracy and capitalism because they 
increased the state’s war making capacity and relative security. This evolution towards 
large territorial powers possessing centralized administrations, republican institutions, 
and standing armies all under an absolute monarch was precisely how Machiavelli 
envisioned his new prince centuries before.7 With the centralization of each government 
into a formal system of delineated territories, populations, and the monopolization over 
the power of coercion, realism once again became the predominant philosophy of 
interstate relations. The buildup of a bewildering array of military force among sovereign 
states led to the rise of the security dilemma and corresponding strategies of deterrence 
and reassurance.8 Deterrence involves the maintenance of sufficient force to deter would 
be aggressors from pursuing conflict, whereas reassurance involves the use of incentives 
to reduce the likelihood of this conflict. Together the two make up a balance of power 
strategy.9  
The security dilemma and the balance of power between sovereign states is a 
result of the anarchy built into the structure of state sovereignty at the international level. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Tilly, War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter B. 
Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 179-
184. 
5 James B. Collins, The State in Early Modern France (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 48. 
6 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of 
Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger and Friedrich Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1962/1991) 
7 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, ed. Peter Bonadella, trans. Peter Bonadella (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 23-30. 
8 Cf. Janice Gross Stein, “Reassurance in International Conflict Management,” Political Science Quarterly 
106, no. 3 (Autumn, 1991), 431-435.  
9 Thomas J. Christensen, “The Contemporary Security Dilemma: Deferring a Taiwan Conflict,” The 
Washington Quarterly 24, no. 4 (2002), 7-11. 
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Since each state is an independent actor, each is capable of initiating war at any moment. 
The balance of power described above is a way to deter, offset or prevent a conflict from 
occurring under this anarchy. During the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, 
however, the greatest dangers facing sovereign states are no longer other states, but rather 
the security threats that fester in the structural anarchy between sovereign states and 
within power vacuums left by failed states. One of these relatively new threats is the 
growing capabilities of non-state actors. Because such actors lack the population and 
territoriality of states, measures of deterrence and reassurance are ineffective. Non-state 
actors can strike out at sovereign states from the shadows of international anarchy with 
relative impunity because they possess an advantage sovereign states do not: mobility. 
Examples of non-state actors include terrorist organizations, criminal cartels, rapacious 
corporations, or even individuals, each of whom have been empowered by technology 
and globalization with the capacity to cause devastating disruptions upon sovereign states 
while receiving disproportionately minor losses. 
This extent of this security weakness was made explicit in the first decade of the 
twenty-first century with the attacks of 9/11 and thereafter by the terrorist organization al 
Qaida. Since such actors can move their financial assets and personnel whenever they are 
threatened, war must be declared on all the territories where these organizations can 
potentially hide. Since virtually all territory on earth has been officially divided between 
sovereign states (save Antarctica), the only territory open for non-state actors to train and 
finance themselves is in the power vacuum of failed states. These territories are ideal 
bases because the inability of their governmental institutions (if they exist) to expel them 
permits non-state actors to hide behind a states de jure sovereignty. Non-state actors are 
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not the only security threats which incubate in failed states as these territories also play 
host to narcotics trafficking, diseases, weapons proliferation, piracy, environmental 
degradation, and civil wars, the effects of which spill across borders and affect the 
economic and political stability of entire regions.10 It is for these reasons that failed states 
constitute the greatest threat to the future security of the sovereign states system. Whereas 
once their effects were believed to be a problem of the global periphery, it is evident 
today that they affect periphery and core states alike.11 
 It can be safely asserted that all failed states are in a state of war. At best, there 
exists a de facto state of social anarchy with no legitimate state institutions whatsoever. 
At worst, these territories resemble a Hobbesian state of nature with all against all.12 
When Paul Collier writes that “ninety-five percent of global production of hard drugs is 
from conflict countries,” he was referring to failed (and weak) states. Not only are these 
states incapable of addressing these security concerns, entire portions of their territory 
may be effectively taken with the capital that non-state actors bring.13 Thus criminal 
cartels have the same advantages and reasons to prey upon failed states as terrorist 
organizations. Rapine corporations complete this triumvirate of dangerous non-state 
actors by supporting internal instability with bribes and direct payments to corrupt elites 
in exchange for market access. This is especially the case in failed states that possess 
crude oil reserves. The situation can be even more dangerous when the territory is 
divided up among warlords and rival tribes who extract what little resources are produced 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Cf. Richard S. Williamson, “Nation-Building: The Dangers of Weak, Failing, and Failed States,” The 
Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations (Winter/Spring 2007), 12-15; and Edward 
Newman, “Failed States and International Order: Constructing a Post-Westphalian World,” Contemporary 
Security Policy 30, no. 3 (December, 2009), 430. 
11 Newman, Failed States and International Order: Constructing a Post-Westphalian World, 435. 
12 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 96. 
13 Paul Collier,  The Bottom Billion, Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can be Done About 
It (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 31. 
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to fight one another. The warlords in most cases do not contribute to endogenous state-
building because their formative work in building extractive capacity is inhibited by the 
easy finance acquired from non-state actors and appropriated aid. 
For the first time in contemporary history, actors without a permanent territory, 
population, or secure means of extracting resources are capable of damaging the most 
powerful states in the world. That an organization of only a few thousand people can 
goad a country of millions into fighting a global war against it highlights the enormous 
advantages non-state actors possess. The financial resources of these organizations can 
easily corrupt local officials and enable the creation of “shadow states,” where non-state 
actors can build temporary bases to finance, recruit, train, and equip their forces shielded 
behind the façade of de jure sovereignty.14 If discovered or under threat of attack, they 
simply abandon their bases and begin anew in a more secure locale. In the meantime, 
however, these actors are fully capable of overpowering failed states whose institutions 
are effectively “hijacked” by them.15  Since the raison d’être of the sovereign state is the 
attainment and maintenance of security over its demarcated territory and population, it is 
becoming increasingly necessary for states to support or directly engage in state-building 
in an effort to minimize the security threats posed to their sovereignty by the anarchy of 
failed states. Should states choose not to address the cause of international security 
threats, they will have to cope with the effects. Either way, the cost to a state is immense.  
The inability of a sovereign state to balance against failed states seriously 
threatens the future viability of the sovereign state paradigm. Theoretically, there are at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 William Reno, “Shadow States and the Political Economy of Civil Wars,” in Greed and Governance, ed. 
M. Berdal & D.M. Malone (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 45-47. 
15 Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2004), 93. 
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least three options open for states to reduce the threat of failed states. Firstly, a state can 
improve its defenses by attempting to control the effects of failed states. This can be done 
by clamping down on borders and keeping a strict eye on all information, personnel, and 
materials that move through them. However, this option may cause civil unrest, 
particularly in liberal-democratic societies as populations are never happy when new 
restrictions are placed on their freedom, even if these restrictions make them safer. 
Moreover, there is a direct correlation between commerce and the modern states ability to 
wage war. 16  Since commerce is dependent on the rapid and flow of goods and 
information to remain globally competitive, we can deduce that a policy which negatively 
affects the movement of goods and/or information will adversely affect a state’s capacity 
to make and sustain war. 
To illustrate this point, consider the case of the US during the initial acts of the 
‘war on terror.’ Shortly after 9/11, the administration of Bush II pushed the infamous 
USA Patriot Act of 2001 through Congress. The results of this bill, initially intended to 
counteract the money laundering activities of terrorists, precipitated virtually every 
subsequent economic disaster the US has experienced to date and reflects the growing 
anachronism of state sovereignty in the face of increasing commercial globalization and 
interdependence. At the time the USA Patriot Act was passed into law, $1.5 trillion, or 
about 5% of the entire world’s economy consisted of illicit money being laundered 
through the US.17 Because the US dollar is the largest reserve currency in the world, the 
US is the only state with the privilege of seignorage. This means that, whereas all other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Jan de Vries, The Economy of Europe in an Age of Crisis, 1600-1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1976), 242. 
17 Loretta Napoleoni. Terrorism and the Economy: How the War on Terrorism is Bankrupting the World 
(New York, NY: Seven Stories Press, 2010), 73. 
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states are limited in the amount of money they can borrow to the amount of their own 
currency in domestic circulation, the US can borrow against the total amount of its 
currency in global circulation. Therefore, the more US currency is horded and spent 
abroad, the more the US can borrow to cover its operations.  
As Napoleoni describes; “in 2000, one-third of newly printed money, amounting 
to about $500 billion, was smuggled out to feed the demand for dollars in the illegal, 
terror, and criminal economies.”18 Ironically, the terrorist’s responsible for 9/11 were 
dependent on American currency to finance these attacks and the construction of the 
World Trade Towers themselves was possible because the US economy was supported by 
the international usage of its currency, in part by the same terrorist organization who 
orchestrated the attack. Therefore, it is of little surprise that even before the Patriot act 
affected Terrorist money laundering activities, the global turnover of the US dollar began 
to shrink and with it the amount of debt the US could take as states began to seek safer 
currency reserves in the Euro.19 The effects were swift and lasting because the US is still 
limited in the amount of debt it can take on. Some may not consider this a bad thing 
considering the enormous amount of debt the US already owes, but the change could not 
have come at a worse time as the US was ratcheting up for its deployments in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. The US government needed the easy credit to finance its ‘war on 
terror.’ To illustrate the cost of this global effort, consider that as of 2010 the total US 
expenditure on defense was “double the combined total of the fifteen nations with the 
highest military expenditure in the world, including the UK.”20 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Napoleoni. Terrorism and the Economy: How the War on Terrorism is Bankrupting the World, 74. 
19 ibid, 76. 
20 ibid, 80. 
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Few Americans will argue, particularly in the wake of the Great Recession, that 
such expenditure on war and social programs is desirable. Interestingly, the group 
responsible for the initial attacks that sparked the ‘war on terror’ and the USA Patriot Act 
of 2001 is still in existence and its successors appear to be making a comeback in 
Afghanistan, though Bin Laden and most of his lieutenants have been killed or captured. 
Carefully considering this example leads us to effectively rule out the strategy of trying to 
control the effects of state-failure. Responses tend to have unforeseen consequences and 
the costs are comparable with the proactive strategy of state-building. There are two ways 
of trying to address the causes of insecurity. The first looks to eliminating the 
international state of anarchy structurally integrated into the sovereign states system. This, 
however, would mean the creation of a world state capable of overcoming the 
sovereignty of each member state. While certain polities seem to be taking a step in this 
direction with supranational political structures like the EU, the achievement of global 
political integration is still a long ways off. None of the world’s most powerful states, 
least of all the US, would be willing to lightly cede sovereignty to a higher political 
authority. Therefore, this attempt to control the causes must be discarded as well. The 
only option left is to eliminate the causes of security threats emerging from failed-states 
is to eliminate failed-states themselves.21 This means a deliberate and concerted effort at 
state-building with the primary objective of increasing international security. 
However, a sovereign state deploying traditional force to eliminate the sources of 
insecurity within a failed state is immediately faced with difficulties. After having 
invaded a failed state and eliminated the immediate security threats, the invading state is 
left with a patient on life support. The invading state must try to create new institutions, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Christensen, The Contemporary Security Dilemma: Deferring a Taiwan Conflict, 7-11. 
 Holland xi	  
or rehabilitate the ones that the state had. Choosing not to operate on the patient will 
cause no reduction in security threats and may even lead to their increase as other actors 
move to take advantage of the sovereignty vacuum. In most cases this situation will be 
exacerbated because the invading country will have destroyed or disabled what little the 
country had in the way of infrastructure in its effort to rid that state of security threats. 
Therefore, it is a necessary and realistic consequence of the distribution of power within 
the international system that international actors engage in state-building operations in 
failed states, particularly after armed intervention therein. The US Army has adopted this 
strategy through trial and error in Iraq. Dubbed “Clear-Hold-Build,” this strategy 
prioritizes the elimination of hostile groups from “high-priority area[s]” (clearing), 
defending them against the return of hostile forces (holding), and then engaging in 
traditional state-building operations in conjunction with other agencies (building).22 
It is essential that international actors acknowledge the threats that have arisen to 
challenge the sovereign states system. By failing to respond to these threats, state 
sovereignty, the current dominant geo-political paradigm, will increasingly be placed in 
jeopardy and with it global stability and order. By eliminating the sovereignty vacuums 
concomitant with state-failure, the primary source of today’s most pressing security 
threats can be eliminated. Additionally, state-builders must come to recognize the role 
identity plays in successful state formation. Failing to incorporate divergent group 
identities into a restructured state will result in illegitimate institutions and recidivism 
into state failure. It is therefore necessary that state-builders play an active role in polling 
the populace for what they normatively desire rather than taking the paternalistic route of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 United States, The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual no. 3-24: Marine Corps 
Warfighting Publication no. 3-33.5 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 5.18-25. 
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deciding what is best for them. In short, this paper argues that international security in 
the twenty-first century will depend on the elimination of failed-states from the sovereign 
state system, that the only way to accomplish this is by exogenous state-building which 
aims at allying the group identities of the population with unique institutions that they 
will view as their own, and that the best means for accomplishing this will be either 
through federacy or partition. 
It is worth repeating at this juncture that the security threats which state-building 
aims at eliminating are not limited to non-state actors. These actors are particularly 
dangerous and represent a new threat to state sovereignty, but they are also co-morbid 
with the aforementioned threats that incubate in a vacuum of sovereignty (e.g. diseases, 
drug trafficking, etc.).23 It must be acknowledged that state-building operations have had 
a mixed history of success. On the one hand, international actors who engage in state-
building have tended to go into these efforts expecting quick outcomes and committing 
insufficient resources. 24  Future state-building operations will have to consider the 
probability that these operations will likely take several decades to complete. As such, the 
burden should be on the international community as a whole and not on any one 
individual state. On the other hand, international actors have tended to look at state-
building primarily as a humanitarian project. Instead they must come to see state-building 
as an international security imperative that has the added benefit of meeting humanitarian 
and human rights objectives. An international actor cannot reduce the security threat 
posed by state failure without eliminating the humanitarian causes at its root; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Williamson, Nation-Building: The Dangers of Weak, Failing, and Failed States, 12-15; and Newman, 
Failed States and International Order: Constructing a Post-Westphalian World, 430.  
24 James Dobbins, et al, The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 
2007), 4-6. 
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humanitarianism and security are intertwined. Since the majority of threats to advanced 
industrial societies come from failed-states, building up their institutional capacity is as 
important for security as balancing conventional and nuclear powers.25  
Instead of focusing on the building of state institutions, intervening states must 
examine the underlying distribution of the populations’ group identities first before 
creating institutions around them. Even though state-building has become much more 
important in the twenty-first century, there is nothing new per se about it. What has 
changed is our understanding of state-building as a process. Every ‘developed’ state has 
gone through state-building in the natural, or endogenous, sense and continues to do so 
by continuously reinventing institutions to keep up with changing times. 26  But 
endogenous development can be arrested by rapacious and oppressive regimes, ongoing 
civil war, genocide, or some similar atrocity befalling the people and undermining the 
institutional capacity and legitimacy of the state.27 Without these two aspects of statehood 
– institutional capacity and legitimacy – there can be no state, just a weak or failed shell 
of one. Moreover, history reveals endogenous state-building to be a particularly bloody 
and repressive affair as dominant groups oppress and forcibly incorporate others.  
Therefore, what is meant by state-building in the contemporary sense is 
exogenous state-building.28 The theoretical basis for which is that it is possible for an 
external actor, given sufficient time, willpower, and resources to transform a failed-
state’s institutions into strong ones. This can only be accomplished by incorporating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Newman, Failed States and International Order: Constructing a Post-Westphalian World, 435. 
26  OECD, “Concepts and Dilemmas of State-Building in Situations of Fragility: From Stability to 
Resilience,” OECD Journal of Development 9, no. 3 (2008), 12.  
27 Shahar Hamieri, “Failed States or Failed Paradigm? State Capacity and the Limits of Institutionalism,” 
Journal of International Relations and Development 10 (2007), 122-137.  
28 Toby Dodge, “Iraq: The Contradictions of Exogenous State-Building in Historical Perspective,” Third 
World Quarterly 27, no. 1 (2006), 189-191. 
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group identities into the process and thereby granting authority to these institutions. 
Because most failed states in the world are former colonies whose populations received 
independence and territorial sovereignty together regardless of sizeable ethnic, religious, 
lingual and cultural minorities within the population, paying heed to identity is the best 
means of resolving long standing disputes.29 In the next chapter we will examine the 
evolution of the state and the sovereign system, as it evolved in the European context, to 
incorporate divergent identity groups within a population into a common institutional 
framework. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 OECD, Concepts and Dilemmas of State-Building in Situations of Fragility: From Stability to Resilience, 
67. 
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CHAPTER ONE: IDENTITY CENTRIC STRATEGIES FOR STATE-BUILDING 
The father of the modern republic, Machiavelli, pointed out the ease with which a 
population accustomed to princely rule can accept another prince. Territories that share 
ethno-linguistic, sectarian, and cultural identities are easy to incorporate because they are 
accustomed to identical institutions. However, territories of diverse languages and 
ethnicities are much more difficult to incorporate. The latter, unfortunately, is the case 
with failed-states, making state-building all the more difficult to perform exogenously. 
Machiavelli gave the new prince the following advice regarding the incorporation of 
governments accustomed to self-rule into his principality: –  
 
“Whoever becomes patron of a city accustomed to living free and does not 
destroy it, should expect to be destroyed by it; for it always has as a refuge in 
rebellion the name of liberty and its own ancient orders which are never forgotten 
either through length of time or because of benefits received. Whatever one does 
or provides for, unless the inhabitants are broken up and dispersed, they will not 
forget the name of those orders, and will immediately recur to them upon any 
accident… [I]n republics there is greater life, greater hatred, more desire for 
revenge; the memory of their ancient liberty does not and cannot let them rest, so 
that the most secure path is to eliminate them or to live in them.”30 
 
In a world where liberal-democratic governments dominate, where mass transportation 
and media have spread material goods and ideas far into the global periphery, it is safe to 
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assume that most of the world has at least seen republican institutions and that many want 
them. This is a good argument that state-building should seek to establish democratic 
regimes and that coercion of the population is not a useful means of getting them to 
embrace it. It is therefore necessary that the choices and allocation of authority to 
institutions not be decided by the intervening state, but by the population that will live 
under it. 
At the heart of the debate over state formation is to what extent states can or 
should be recreated in a way that differs fundamentally from their predecessors. Nowhere 
is this subject more contentious than in the arena of territoriality and self-determination. 
Taking divergent group identities into account and allowing them to choose their own 
fate within a unitary, federal, partially autonomous (federacy), or independent 
(partitioned) territory incites heated debate and ardent defenses of the sacrosanct nature 
of territorial borders, particularly when they have been declared ‘national.’ In Bosnia 
After Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention, Sumantra Bose argues 
that the primary cause of intense ethnic and sectarian violence is not the security dilemma 
that exists between rival identities, but from the possible threat of immanent partition.31 
Although Bose raises many very good points about the insufficiency of the security 
dilemma explanation as cause inter-ethnic and sectarian violence, it fails to adequately 
describe why partition is not better in the long term to solve that violence. I argue that the 
violence that was sparked by the mere possibility of partition is an example of why it is 
necessary. If a people do not have the right to self-determination, and they are forced by 
the dominant group of the state to remain in a specific kind of association against their 
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will, how is the resulting state any different from a multi-ethnic empire? He uses the 
cases of the partition of Bengal and the breakup of the former Yugoslav republic, but 
remains silent on the genocide in Rwanda, where no threat of partition existed to 
precipitate ethnic violence.32  
It is the violence that erupts between these groups that necessitates international 
intervention and state-building. However, the idea that territories should be held together 
by international fiat or the will of the majority smacks of imperialism. That the Republika 
Srpska should be forced by the international community and the majority Bosnian 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to remain part of the Republic of Bosnia against 
the wishes of the majority of its population seems counter-productive.33 The idea that a 
consociational framework will yield some fruit of peace and stability down the road is an 
act of faith, not reason. It seems particularly absurd in cases like Bosnia where both sides 
engaged in genocide and ethnic cleansing. Bose claims that “consociation may be the 
most viable institutional option [for Bosnia], short of formal partition, redrawing of 
boundaries and exchange of populations.”34 Bose elsewhere speaks ardently against the 
idea of partition, so in effect; his is an argument for consociationalism.35 It is the height 
of hypocrisy for countries like the US and France, the progenitors of the revolutionary 
age, to tell another people that they have no right to secede from their sovereign state. 
What Bose fails to mention in advocating consociationalism as an option of last 
resort is the option of federacy or partial autonomy. The main difference between partial-
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autonomy and complete partition is that in a federacy relationship the core states territory 
remains intact, but a certain region or regions enjoy significant levels of autonomy in 
relation to the core. If it can be pulled off, federacy is always a better option than 
partition, but it still has its detractors. John McGarry points out two of the most 
prominent arguments against federacy that have surfaced to date. The first was articulated 
by the late Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, and claimed that federacy might 
increase the likelihood of secession because these partially independent territories have a 
“special” responsibility for their own people and the central government less so. The 
second is that it has features that are inherently undemocratic. A partially independent 
territory has more say in the central government of democratic states tan that central 
government has in the affairs of the federacy.36 
Whereas there is a legitimate problem with the undemocratic features of federacy, 
I would argue that this is a necessary feature of this species of political institution and 
that overall the choice is better for both the core and the federacy than the alternatives 
which would either be brutal suppression or secession. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely 
that federacies will use their position as leverage to force core state into political 
positions they do not want to be in. This is because federacies are by nature the weaker of 
the two parties as their status of partial autonomy is dependent upon the willingness of 
the core government to honor its commitment. In terms of the possibility of partial 
autonomy to encourage secession, McGarry points out that the opposite is in fact the case. 
Using the case of Quebec during the 1995 referendum, McGarry argues persuasively that 
secession and de facto partition would have been the case had Canada not agreed to 
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asymmetrical accommodation.37 Federacies do actually have a binding power for keeping 
territories together, despite divergent identities.  
I will argue later, however, that this only goes so far and when these identity 
groups actively seek to exterminate one another, the advantages of federacy begin to 
decrease and partition becomes the better option. The inherent advantages of partition 
and federalism in the context of failed states relates, as we will see shortly, to their ability 
to give voice to divergent group identities. When peoples are allowed to choose with 
whom they will associate freely, then the resulting political institutions will be stable and 
have legitimate authority instead of relying on coercion. I do not rule out the more 
conventional arrangements of unitary or federal states, but these cases, which require that 
a population can peaceably inhabit the same political and territorial spaces, is not 
practical for many failed states in which various identities have a history of brutal conflict. 
Failed-states, by default, require decentralization to survive because the violence required 
to bring centralized order is no longer morally permissible. For the rest of this chapter, 
therefore, we will delve deeper into the structural relationship between state-building, 
institutional legitimacy, and identity. 
 
1.1 – The Basis of Legitimate Institutional Capacity 
First and foremost, every state will eventually fail if it lacks the authority to 
legitimate its institutional capacity. The source of this institutional legitimacy comes from 
the authority that the population imparts upon its institutions. This requires popular 
identification of the population with the institutions they will live under and a sense of 
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ownership in them. In other words, state institutions cannot exist if they merely rule over 
a population; instead the population has to see them as distinctly theirs. I assert here, in 
no uncertain terms, that the only source of legitimate authority in all political systems is 
through the demos. Without co-opting the demos, a state cannot attain legitimacy and its 
claims to legitimacy will be based solely on coercion, similar to what Weber and Tilly 
describe above. The nature of these institutions whether they are democratic or 
authoritarian, elected or unelected, does not matter when it comes to the need for the 
population to recognize them as legitimate. A population will not support a regime in its 
hour of weakness, which comes to all regimes with time, if they do not see it as 
normative and worth keeping. 
In other words, it takes authority to make institutions legitimate and this always 
comes from the demos, in particular, the willingness of the population to identify with 
state institutions as normative and to have faith in their allocation of authority to them.38 
Authority is always legitimate because it is recognized as such through faith; a lack of 
faith means that the state has lost its authority de facto. A failed state can maintain a 
semblance of authority de jure by the recognition of its sovereign peers, but it cannot 
exist in fact without the populace to support it. Do not forget that most of Europe 
opposed the revolution in France and wanted a scion of the house of Bourbon back on the 
throne. However, were this achieved during the revolution, the would-be monarch would 
have been immediately deposed (and likely beheaded), because the population did not see 
the monarch as a legitimate authority anymore. This does not deny, however, that over 
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time a claim to authority arising from coercion cannot become legitimate. Indeed it can, 
but the process is long and paved with bloodshed and repression. Ultimately, it will 
require the demos to identify with and accept the institutions propped up by force. 
It follows from this understanding of authority that failed states are such not 
because they lack the monopoly on coercion, but because the population does not identify 
with their institutions. Because there is so little popular identification, institutions are not 
maintained when the presence of the state-coercive apparatus is absent. This is a case of 
government by day, anarchy by night so to speak. But this power to coerce, again, in such 
circumstances is merely an illegitimate manifestation of power until it inculcates or earns 
the identification of the people.39 The lack of legitimate authority in failed states leaves 
only the militant groups as the de facto claimants on authority. Traditional state-building 
has focused on supplying aid and building institutions from the top-down, starting with 
the government. If what I have just argued about legitimate authority arising from the 
people is true, then the current strategy is a proverbial case of placing the cart before the 
horse. It is difficult for populations to identify with and feel a sense of ownership in 
institutions that were placed over them by outsiders. Furthermore, it is impossible that 
institutions introduced exogenously will be self-standing within a few short years unless 
they are not very different from the ones that preceded them.  
In failed states, exogenously created institutions do not have a legitimate basis of 
authority and need long periods of time for the population to entrust them with it. It is not 
any easier to implant institutions and order the people to cherish and support them than it 
is for a shepherd to pick a sheep as the leader and have the rest follow suit. Nature alone 
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determines these things because there are an infinite number of variables that cannot be 
controlled for. It is therefore much more efficient to exogenously encourage endogenous 
development. The success of such operations increases when the population is similar to 
that of the intervening state in language, culture, and idea of the good. This however, is 
no guarantee that the population will identify with these institutions, people are ever 
capricious and it is difficult to predict in what way they are inclined to move. By 
providing exogenous encouragement we are adding a sheep-dog to the mix. 
 In the contemporary international climate, setting up the conditions whereby the 
population can determine things for themselves without fear of reprisal is essential. Since 
the international community has claimed that a right of self-determination exists for all 
peoples, every population group should have some say in what state they will live under. 
A state is less a rational-legal entity with a monopoly over legitimate violence than it is a 
social institution imbued with a mystical authority that people accept through faith. 
Weber articulated three sources of legitimate authority: charisma, tradition, and rational-
legalism.40 It was his belief that these institutions inspired in the population of a state 
Legitimitätsglaube (faith/belief).41 Some quasi-religious form of faith or belief is the best 
way to view the kind of relationship that exists between a population and the authority 
allocated to its state institutions. However I believe that Weber was wrong to claim that 
the state is the source of legitimate authority and that the population responds with faith 
in it. If this were the case, all state-builders would have to do is place a charismatic leader 
in power, resurrect ancient institutions, create new ones, or put in place a rational-
legalistic bureaucracy to have legitimate authority. State-building operations that have 
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focused only on these elements in the past have failed, implying another dimension to the 
problem. It seems that in this instance Locke and Hobbes were right; men must escape 
anarchy (nature) and make institutions before these institutions can remake men.42 
Just because a charismatic, traditional, or rational-legal system is placed over a 
population does not guarantee that they will come to see it as the legitimate. I argue that 
this is because these three institutions of authority are claims upon legitimacy, they are 
not the embodiment of it, nor can they create it. As noted above, legitimacy comes from 
the faith that the demos places in these institutions, not the other way around. Therefore, 
the direction of causality that Weber explains is incomplete. Claims to authority are only 
made legitimate when the population over which they will be salient recognizes their 
authority. If it is put in place at the behest of outsiders, then it is only natural for a 
population to resist it. Under these circumstances, the claimants to authority that Weber 
delineated compete for legitimacy. Even the most charismatic authoritarian dictator needs 
to be recognized as the authority before he or she has legitimacy. If this image cannot be 
projected then all the dictator has is power, not authority.43 To be sure, there is a 
difference between a citizen’s normative realization of a state and a serf’s passive 
acceptance of one, but in both cases it is only through the subjects that authority is 
legitimated/created. Claimants may be capable of achieving authority through power and 
time, but the original source is not the claimant; it is the population.  
It is important that we do not get caught up here with the problematic distinction 
between realism and idealism; state-building is both. With democratic-liberalism as the 
dominant political ideology, it makes sense that state-builders would seek to replicate it 
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given the thrown-ness of their situation.44 State-building is idealistic in that it satisfies the 
ideals of achieving institutional capacity and humanitarianism goals. However, it is also 
realistic in that it seeks to plug a whole in the international system of sovereignty that 
cannot be traditionally balanced against. From the perspective of an external actor, 
however, international security is the more important because of the increasing 
interdependence of global markets and politics. It is fortuitous that humanitarian issues 
need to be resolved to further the ends of security. The ultimate goal of state-building is 
the elimination of various threats to international security that incubate in the power 
vacuum of failed states. The test of whether or not state-building has been or should be 
pursued is whether or not the solution will be long-term and prevent recidivism insofar as 
it is possible. It is for the reasons articulated here that exogenous state-building must 
focus on both institutional capacity and popular legitimacy. Since the basis of legitimacy 
is the popular identification of social groups with state institutions, it follows that every 
effort should be made to ascertain these identities and incorporate them into the state-
building process. This will involve regional pacification as well as a full understanding 
the identity landscape of the population, before conducting an informed referendum and 
drafting the state constitution(s).  
To achieve this end, it may be necessary for an outside actor to engage in partition 
or federacy/partial autonomy. This option is off the table if the population themselves do 
not want to be separated from one another. If they do not, but are, then legitimacy may 
become completely out of reach to the intervening power as nationalist sentiments are 
kindled. However, in cases where a population does not want to remain in association 
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with others, there is no legitimate way to oppose them. In the case of Iraq, the Sunni and 
Shi’a sects were far more opposed than the Kurds to a partition of the country. However, 
the Kurds were persuaded to remain part of the country, despite a long history of 
atrocities committed against them.45 Had they wished to be separate from greater Iraq, 
then there would have been no just alternative than to let them go and for the state-builder 
to defend that decision. Partition is generally opposed as unrealistic or imperial; however, 
such bloodletting may in the long run be the most mature choice to make in the name of 
peace.46 As noted above, I do hold that the Republika Srpska is an example of an unjust 
outcome and that, so long as its population does not want to remain unified with the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is up to the international community to defend 
and help develop them so that peace can be reestablished. 
The term failed state refers primarily to the inability of these states to carry out 
the most basic function of the contemporary ‘nation-state’, namely the provision of 
protection (security) through powers of extraction and coercion.47 There are, however, 
only a few states that are capable and/or willing to expend the resources necessary to 
build up another state exogenously, despite the rather obvious security incentives to do so. 
The most prominent state-builders are the US and its NATO allies, the UN, and the EU 
with a combined total of 21 state-building operations since the end of the Second World 
War.48 There is reason to believe that the list of actors is expanding, however, as 
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Australia has engaged in state-building in the Solomon Islands and East Timor.49 
Moreover, resurgent powers like China are beginning to exert their international 
influence, particularly in African countries like Sudan.50 However, the list of state-
building actors is still very biased toward liberal-democracies. This is not much of a 
surprise given that commerce and democracy require an open forum for information to 
flow, leaving states that subside off of these institutions in a particularly vulnerable 
condition in relation to the threats arising from failed states. Although the problem would 
seem to be less pronounced in authoritarian regimes due to their extensive coercive 
capabilities and purported ability to track and block people and information, the 2002 
spread of SARS out of Guangdong Province China is evidence that even these regimes 
have difficulty controlling the sort of threats that typically arise from failed states.51   
 Some scholars, however, advocate the traditional ‘western’ approach to state-
building. In this view, violence and genocide are a necessary and unavoidable step in 
state formation. All of the worlds most developed states have gone through this trial by 
fire during their formative years. Therefore, these scholars argue, there is no reason to 
believe that we can or should prevent the violence that occurs at the founding of all 
strong states. In The Paradoxical Nature of State Making: The Violent Creation of Order, 
the authors argue that state failure is not the same as state-decay, but rather that the 
resulting violence is endogenous state-building.52 This line of thinking can be seen in 
Ernest Renan’s famous 1882 lecture at the Sorbonne, Qu’est-ce qu’une nation? In which 
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he states that “historical research, in fact, brings to light the deeds of violence that have 
taken place at the commencement of all political formations… Unity is ever achieved by 
brutality.”53 States are the products of unity and unity is a byproduct of violence, 
therefore violence is necessary for the state. But for the exogenous state-building school, 
it is hoped that state-building operations can circumvent the horrors concomitant with 
classical state consolidation.  
But the entirely endogenous strategy overlooks the realities of today’s 
interdependent economic system. Allowing civil wars and atrocities to continue without 
intervention causes harm to this global system through mass migrations and increased 
violence. Moreover, since the Second World War, powers have asserted the existence of 
universal human rights and have in most (admittedly not all) cases sought to uphold them. 
Therefore, most scholars agree that exogenous state-building is possible and necessary, 
but they are cognizant of the inherent limitations for intervening states face, especially 
when attempting to reconstitute a unitary state after civil war. Marina Ottaway writes in 
Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States that; “extreme fragmentation makes it 
impossible to reach an agreement among all the parties and also makes it more difficult 
for them to see that a stalemate has been reached.”54 Similarly, Chaim Kauffmann writes 
that “restoring civil politics in multi-ethnic states shattered by war is impossible because 
the war itself destroys the possibilities for ethnic cooperation.”55 But civil war and ethnic 
identity are not the only impediments to exogenous state-building. Amitai Etzioni notes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Ernest Renan, “What is a nation,” in Poetry of the Celtic Races and Other Studies, trans. W.G. 
Hutchinson (London: W. Scott, 1882/1896), 66.  
54 Marina Ottaway, “Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States,” Development and Change 33, no. 5 
(2002), 1014-1019.  
55 Chaim Kauffman, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” International Security 20, 
no. 4 (Spring, 1996), 137. 
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that state-building “will be difficult, slow, costly and, above all, next to impossible for 
outsiders to achieve. Cultivating respect for law where little exists, making a middle class, 
greatly reducing corruption where it is rampant – all are difficult tasks.”56 Indeed they are 
difficult, but necessary, given the international security implications of not addressing 
them. 
It is therefore the project of exogenous state-building to isolate group identities, in 
other words, identify them so that they can be protected under a blanket of security and 
be encouraged to manifest institutions that they will have ownership and faith in, thereby 
legitimizing them. Once this is accomplished, these territories should have the 
institutional capacity to stand guard against the security threats which threaten their own 
stability, as well as the security of all sovereign states, and resist the pull toward 
recidivism and state-failure. Below I have outlined three general strategies that state-
builders can take to encourage state-building, either by leaving the state to develop 
endogenously (the least favorable option), engaging in direct exogenous state-building, or 
indirectly supporting endogenous state-building exogenously. Armed with a better 
understanding of this process, we can begin to articulate a set of strategies aimed at the 
creation of institutionally strong and stable states that will satisfy both humanitarian and 
security ends. In terms of agricultural and industrial societies, a well-governed state is 
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1.2 – Three Strategies for State-Builders 
Exogenous and endogenous state-building can be seen as two different strategies 
that strong states can follow in relation to failed states. The difference between the two is 
a question of whether or not to engage in direct military intervention. If a state chooses 
not to intervene directly, that is, by deploying force, then it can either wait for a state to 
develop endogenously or it can use aid and other incentives to guide the failed state 
towards a desired outcome. Teleologically, the aim of both strategies is the same; to 
allow for or create a legitimate regime with stable institutions that have sufficient scope 
and capacity, supported by identification, for its authority to be unimpeachable and to be 
capable of countering domestic security threats before they become international ones. 
Such a state, when it has finished forming, will not fall prey to outside actors, corruption, 
or overly ambitious generals. Instead, it will preserve itself against these threats and in so 
doing, increase security for all other states. In terms of regime type some scholars, such 
as Jose Maravall, would argue that this regime would be a western-style liberal-
democratic regime.57 Others, such as Robert Kaplan point to the success of authoritarian 
regimes in rapid economic development.58 Fareed Zacharia on the other hand writes that 
democracy is little different than authoritarianism if it is illiberal and unconstitutional.59 
Prior to the question of regime type, however, is the strategic starting point for state-
builders, they are expressed as follows: – 
 
1. Direct Exogenous Intervention: Recognizing the international security threats that 
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arise in failed states effect all, and that the domestic capacities of the government 
of such states is either insufficient or nonexistent, there arises a sovereign 
imperative to intervene militarily to engage these threats and state-build until that 
state is strong enough to resist them on its own. The best way to do this for a long 
term solution within the post-colonial context is to engage in state-building with 
sufficient resources to guard and build up the incipient state to the point where 
recidivism is least likely. The strengths of this strategy are that it allows the actor 
to quickly and directly influence the events occurring within the developing state. 
The major weakness of this strategy are that there is no guarantee whatsoever that 
the new or reconstituted government will have legitimacy. This strategy, 
otherwise known as peacemaking, has been employed predominantly by the 
United States (US) and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, the 
United Nation (UN), European Union (EU) and Australia.  
 
2. Isolated Endogenous Development: Understanding that most of today’s great 
powers and the first states of the modern era were formed through periods of 
violent internal conflict that aided in the formation of ‘national’ identities, this 
strategy advocates a hands-off approach. To counter the threats that arise in failed 
states, a state-builder should focus on their own defensive capabilities and prevent 
other states from intervening in failed states. The prevention of other states 
interference is heightened by the security dilemma and a desire not to see another 
country strengthened by some form of neo-colonialism. Historically, these rules 
have ceded power to more democratic institutions and market economies for their 
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greater extractive capabilities. Non-intervention is the key to allowing a legitimate 
national government to form and not just one that has the largest military or the 
widest de jure recognition. 
 
3. Indirect Exogenous Support of Endogenous Development: As a compromise 
between military intervention and tacitly supporting humanitarian crises, this 
strategy seeks to provide indirect and peaceful support, preferably to weak states 
before they fail, but also to failed state populations that are suffering and 
displaced by the conflict. Intervention usually takes the form of providing aid to 
the populace, offering to oversee the peace settlements, providing opportunities to 
the population for asylum and education abroad, providing direct payments as a 
carrot for governments to reform and imposing sanctions when they go astray. In 
other words, this is a strategy of peacekeeping. It seeks to intervene only so much 
as it feels it must do to promote peace and avoids action that will reduce the rights 
of state sovereignty while trying to further humanitarian goals. This has been the 
primary UN peacekeeping strategy for most of that organizations history. 
 
Regardless of what state-building strategy is used, the grounds for labeling the 
operation a success should be an increase of state capacity and legitimacy.60 Whereas 
there seems to be the possibility of conflict between actors who choose the first and 
second strategies described above, particularly over the issue of direct military 
intervention vs. protection, the resulting disagreement does not seem to have sparked a 
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war between intervening states yet. Simply put, states do not engage in state building 
because they want to, rather they do so because they have to. State-building is 
prohibitively expensive and does nothing to generate revenue the way that the old 
colonies did for Europe. It is a deadweight loss that is only justifiable on the grounds of 
human rights, national security, or creating a more open and stable global economy. 
Since no country wants to do it, the job falls to the UN, unless the justifications are so 
great that it draws in the US, NATO, or in the near future, some other great power, to 
action. Moreover, because the US is a permanent member of the UN Security Council 
(UNSC) and the US and NATO countries collectively are the largest annual contributors 
to the UN budget, the likelihood of a showdown between these institutions is virtually 
nonexistent.  
What has not been answered yet is why failed states are the way they are. We can 
see the basics; lack of legitimate institutions, a changing global economic and security 
paradigm, juridical sovereignty, etc. But until we can see the evolution of the modern 
state from its beginnings, we will fail to fully understand how our own thrown-ness, our 
historicity, determines the perspective that we will take toward state-building and 
whether or not we have missed anything along the way. In short, we must figure out 
exactly what we hold the state to be before we can act positively to establish it elsewhere, 
otherwise all we are doing is replicating our institutions and assuming that they hold. 
Therefore, this next chapter will focus on defining the state and articulating how the 
system of sovereignty in which the state is embedded evolved out of a distinctly 
European context and whether or not there are hidden dangers we should be aware of 
when we try to exogenously replicate these institutions. 
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CHAPTER TWO: A GENEALOGY OF THE SOVEREIGN STATE 
The state is among the most mysterious and profound creations of the human 
imagination. For Plato, the state (polis) was a reflection in institutions of the soul (psyche) 
and a change in one would nurture changes in the other.61 For the Romans, the state was 
the abstract embodiment of imperium Romanum; the genius Roman people and senate’s 
authority.62 It was the glory of supreme authority, sanctioned by the Gods unifying of the 
various peoples of the republic. With modernity, the view of the state changed from the 
mystical to the rational, from the normative to the descriptive. Max Weber defined the 
modern state as “the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory.”63 Similarly, Charles Tilly described states as “quintessential protection rackets 
with the advantage of legitimacy.”64 It is impossible to engage in state-building efficiently 
without having an accurate description of what the state is and, if necessary, a normative 
claim as to what it should be. State-building, endogenous and exogenous, seeks to repair 
either directly or indirectly the weak institutions that lead to state-failure. But what is 
state success? It is ironic that most who advocate state-building are struck silent by the 
idea of actually defining what the state actually is. Deciding upon some objective 
empirical grounds for state success requires that a series of normative choices be made. 
The telos of state building is presumed to be what ‘successful-states’ have. It is therefore 
necessary that, from the outset we try to discover what the fundamentals of the state are.  
An examination of the etymology of the word state and how its meaning has 
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evolution over time is as good a place as any to begin. The centrality of a definition for 
the state is paramount because without being able to define it, we are operating blind in 
recreating it, having only a directionless state-building policy. Should all states really try 
to become Western-styled liberal-democracies? I will try to convince you that this is 
neither necessary, nor desirable, and that ultimately that choice can only be made by the 
population and not by the state-builder or the majority within the state subject to the 
state-building operation. We can impose any sort of regime, but without a population to 
identify with it, sustain it with legitimate authority, and perpetuate it in the absence of 
force, no regime produced by exogenous fiat will last long. Therefore, with a stable state 
as the teleological goal of state-building, we must find what we mean by failure, and 
conversely, what we mean by state-success.  
The first substantive usage of the word state in its modern sense of something 
akin to regime is generally attributed to Nicollo Machiavelli’s 16th century work Il 
Principe.65 The way in which Machiavelli used this word caused its meaning to subtly 
change over the succeeding centuries. Whereas once state meant something temporally 
fixed (i.e. the status of something), it came to mean something that is abstract, a-temporal 
and unchanging. The novelty of this usage was that the estate, or property of the prince, 
did not require the owner but would survive him after his death. The Sovereign was not 
required for his realm to have sovereignty. This idea, simply put, was the creation of the 
Renaissance. The word state comes to English, like so many other words, by way of Old 
French (estat – état), which in turn comes from the Latin (status “standing, position”, 
from the verb stare “to stand”). In its original context, the state was that which stands. 
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The Romans would use the word both to inquire about the ‘state’ of the Republic, or the 
status or standing of individuals.  
Today, we retain this idea when we discuss social status; it is ones standing 
within society. We have also preserved the original, temporal meaning of state when we 
discuss a state of mind, a state of matter, or hear the US President’s State of the Union 
Address. However, the word state in the political context has been completely divorced 
from its original meaning through narrowing and semantic specialization. The 
specialization of the word state carries with it its own genealogy that cannot be divorced 
from the historical context of Western political development. In medieval Europe, state 
meant specifically personal status, and the territorial or property aspect of state-ness was 
inseparable from the social in this period. During the feudal era, if you had any social 
status, then you were propertied with an estate. Otherwise you were a serf or clergy (serf 
to Christ). It was inconceivable during this time that property and social status could be 
divorced and still exist. If someone did not have property or social status, they could give 
off the appearance of having them by being stately, but this was merely an illusion.  
Machiavelli’s synthesis of the word seems to have been a synthesis of the way the 
word was used in society with the way it was used in the arts. This is not much of a 
surprise given that Machiavelli was a Florentine living at the height of the Italian 
renaissance. Within the artistic context, the Latin verb stare had led to status and statua 
(image/statue “that which is set up”). It was typical Machiavellian sleight of hand to use 
the word in its artistic sense of a statue; that which is set up and stands through time.66 
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The evolution of the word state however did not end here as it would take on a new 
connotation of property without any owner but the abstract will of the people in the 
modern era.  In short, the history that will follow details how the modern state is a relic of 
the ahistorical notion of social status among propertied persons, grafted as it where onto a 
culture attempting to legitimate republican and liberal institutions within the juridical 
confines of European Christianity and monasticism.  
 
2.1 – Classical and Christian Origins of the Sovereign State 
Within political science, there are two general approaches to understanding the 
state. For the sake of brevity, I will refer to these alternatively as the right-school and the 
force-school. Between the two, the right-school is the more ancient understanding and is 
as old as political philosophy. Essentially, its premise is that the purpose of the state is to 
shape institutions so that certain right or moral ends are pursued. All classical Greek and 
Roman philosophers believed that human beings can only reach their fullest potential 
through education and experience and that the state was the mechanism for correcting 
immoral behavior and encouraging correct moral development. It was this line of 
thinking that led the philosopher George W.F. Hegel to define the state as; “the actuality 
of the ethical Idea.”67  The state was the ethical ideal of its citizens and, conversely, the 
purpose of the state was to develop ideal citizens. The rights you had under this system 
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were positive; you had the right to participate in making the laws of government and 
carrying out official duties.68  
However, this vision of citizenship has been largely cast aside since Machiavelli 
wrote the Prince.  The new paradigm that espoused in the literature is the force school 
and it aims not at normativity, but description. As we described at the outset, social 
scientists like Max Weber have looked at the state as the monopoly over the legitimate 
use of violence or physical coercion.69  In addition, the rights guaranteed by the state 
were no longer positive, but negative, in that they were rights against something.70 Locke 
especially was an advocate for rights against the state, natural rights that could not be 
given up or taken away without being reintroduced into a state of nature.71 Contrariwise, 
in the classical world, the idea of rights that the individual could assert against the state 
would have been inconceivable. The state, or polis, was the source of all rights and to 
have rights against it would have meant that there were no rights at all. Every citizen was 
necessary for the maintenance of a free society and this meant constant preparation for 
war.  
If a citizen were capable of claiming rights against the state, then the solidarity on 
which the state martial institutions survived would be in jeopardy. It was also 
inconceivable to the ancients that vice (greed) should be the basis of society. To engage 
in commerce and be a private person were despicable things not to be engaged in by 
noble citizens. Instead, such activities were left to the metics (resident aliens) in Greece 
or to the plebians and eques in Rome; never to someone with actual social status even 
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though the profits to be made were great. This is because social status derived from 
public participation. Nobility were expected to be virtuous and earn their living through 
agriculture instead of manufacture and trade, both of which breed faction instead of 
solidarity. The modern focus on making the individual independent of the state meant the 
end of the era of citizen-soldier solidarity. The Greek word for someone who turned away 
from public for private life was idiotes, literally an idiot.  
Lastly, the accumulation of property without limit was defined as avarice, it 
encouraged people to leave the public sphere and engage in meaningless private pursuits 
that would undermine freedom. Freedom, specifically, was the right of a citizen to be 
public and have a say in the creation of laws. The institutions of modern democracy still 
bear the vestiges of this era even as they consistently undermine the moral foundations 
that the ancients build civil society on. The values maintained in the democratic systems 
we see today are come from Greek and Roman thought, but also from Christianity. In 
particular, it is from the Christian tradition that we have built into our institutions the idea 
of equality. The Athenians may well have invented democracy as a form of government, 
but their society still had some 40 thousand Greek male citizens ruling a territory what 
encompassed some 400 thousand women, children, slaves and metics. Despite the 
concerted effort to turn away from Church institutions during the Renaissance and 
Enlightenment, the ideals that these institutions had habituated among the populace were 
far too subterranean to be extirpated. Therefore, even though neither the classical 
civilizations nor Christianity form the basis of the modern secular liberal-democratic state, 
aspects of them persist relatively unchanged, in particular the ideal of public participation, 
defense of one’s own country, liberal education, and universal equality among citizens. 
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2.2 – The Transition to Modern-Secular Institutions 
If we take Machiavelli and the renaissance to be the infancy of the modern era, we 
can see how property and status, and the legal exceptionalism of the sovereign were 
incorporated into a new secular and abstract vision of the state. Every state is perfectly 
capable of ‘nationalizing’ the private property within its borders because the body politic 
has retained the legal exceptionalism that was the sovereign’s personal privilege as lord 
and master of the realm. For instance, it was settled in the Peace of Westphalia that the 
sovereign had the right to choose the official state religion of his realm – the alternatives 
being Catholicism, Calvinism and Lutheranism at that time. The hegemony of the Papacy 
in European politics had entered its dying phase and with it medieval Europe. Moreover, 
during the reign of Louis XIII, Cardinal Richelieu ordered that all castles and defenses 
not essential to the defense of the kingdom be destroyed in an effort to neutralize the 
threats posed be feudal lords and centralize authority directly under the monarch.72  
Architecturally, this period saw a sharp decline in castle building and an increase 
in the construction of villas and palaces, including the great palace of Versailles in France 
and the famous villas of Palladio in Italy. In short, there was a juridical coup that took the 
power away from the 1st estate (clergy) and the 2nd estate (nobility), while providing new 
opportunities to the 3rd (commoners).73 The king was now not only absolute, but legally 
his person had an immortal aspect that carried the permanence of his property – the realm. 
This was reflected in the remarks of Louis XIV, the more famous of which is not 
verifiable, but provides an interesting portrayal: “L'État, c'est moi” (‘I am the state’), and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 James B. Collins, The State in Early Modern France, 48. 
73 William H. Sewell, JR. “Historical Events as Transformations of Structures: Inventing Revolution at the 
Bastille,” Theory and Society 25 (1996), 846.   
 Holland 26	  
on his deathbed in 1715: “Je m’en vais, mais l’Etat demeurera toujours” (‘I depart, but 
the state shall always remain’).74,75 In a process centuries earlier, all monarchs were 
claimed to have two bodies in juridical terms; the corpus naturale and corpus mysticum. 
It was through this legal mechanism that medieval legal scholars were able to judge the 
rights and dominance of the king over the realm and population, as such the idea evolved 
out of the most powerful political institution of that time; the church. Throughout the 
middle ages, church doctrine stipulated that Christ had two bodies. The first was the 
corpus naturale, the consecrated host on the altar. This is was the physical body of Christ 
that, through transubstantiation of bread into the body and wine into his blood of Christ, 
allowed for their consumption during Holy Communion. The second body, the corpus 
mysticum, was the church itself and all Christians as the body of the lord of hosts. In 
medieval jurisprudence the king had a corpus naturale (physical body) which would 
grow old and die, become diseased, etc.  
In European jurisprudence however, kings also had the corpus mysticum (magical 
body) that was immortal, could never be destroyed and was representative of the power 
of his regime and society.76 However, before the modern era, the corpus mysticum could 
be appropriated by conquest, lost with the extinction of a king’s line, or given away by 
abdication. In the modern era, the argument developed that it could be taken back by the 
people, the real source of sovereignty through revolution. Therefore, it took 
enlightenment thinkers to argue that the corpus politic (body politic) and that the people 
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in general were justified in taking this aspect of the kings person away.77 Despite the 
change in who possesses the “body”, the separation the sovereign remains standard 
practice. States are recognized to have de jure sovereignty (mystical), even when they 
have no de facto sovereignty (natural); a general predicament in failed states. Revolutions 
and the ideas that appropriated sovereignty to the body politic was the product of the 3rd 
estate, which was now coming to dominate the political system through the revolutions of 
Great Britain, the United States, and then France. Increasingly liberal markets and 
expanding international trade provided greatly increased extractive capabilities to kings 
just as it made them less necessary for the security of the state. When the king came to be 
a threat to security or stability, he was removed through revolution and the intellectual 
public of the bourgeois class led to a new political paradigm. But the appropriation of 
sovereignty, formerly in the possession of a single person, into a society of millions of 
persons, created some problems. It seems that the founders of these societies expected 
republicanism foster this unity. They had forgotten that those who had invented these 
systems shunned commerce.  
Unity did develop, but it was not through reason, it was through an emotion; 
nationalism. At his Sorbonne lecture, Ernest Renan conceded that “forgetfulness, I would 
even say historical error, are essential in the creation of a nation”, historical research is 
dangerous to the survival of the nation because it can reveal unwanted truths.78 He also 
claimed that the nation existed through a ‘daily plebiscite’ or ‘referendum’.79 These 
sentiments were the expression of 19th century nationalist identity that by that point 
dominated Europe. It was through a sense of nationalism that a state achieved the 
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identification of the people with its institutions and became legitimate. Nationalism 
appropriated the sovereignty that was taken from the monarchs because a large 
population with manifold interests cannot easily wield it. But a population embracing a 
shared idea of self and history could, this is why the myth of the nation has persisted so 
long. It enabled the majority of the population to identify with the state, and the minority 
could always be claimed as the same as the nation, even when they were subjugated by it. 
The semblance of a common ethnicity/culture and historical destiny unified the 
population and gave a certain authority to state institutions.  
This system lasted a century before serious problems began to surface. By the late 
19th and beginning of the 20th centuries it was increasingly realized that few, if any, states 
of the world were really nation-states. The idea of the nation-state was maintained 
through two world wars because there was no alternative abstract idea capable of holding 
a large population of many interests and identities together. As Walker Connor describes, 
the word nation comes from the Latin and conveyed “the idea of common blood ties. It 
was derived from the past-participle of the verb nasci, meaning to be born. And hence the 
Latin noun, nationem, connoting breed or race.”80 Connor goes on quote the French 
Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen: “the source of all sovereignty resides 
essentially in the nation; no group, no individual may exercise authority not emanating 
expressly therefrom,” adding that “the drafters of the declaration may not have been 
aware, “the nation” to which they referred contained Alsatians, Basques, Bretons, 
Catalans, Corsicans, Flemings, and Occitanians, as well as Frenchmen.”81 It is no wonder 
that the terminology between state-building and nation-building has become so 
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confounded.82  Western-styled liberal-democracies are still in a position where some way 
of abstracting identification enough so that a large population can collectively share in 
legitimizing institutions is necessary for state-survival.  
 
2.3 – State-Building in A Post-National Context 
The important question arises, of whether our own institutions are compatible 
with the underlying logic of authority within our societies. This is a question of the 
utmost importance because our starting point in state-building is to replicate the strong 
and stable institutions we believe ourselves to possess. If these institutions are actually 
unstable then we may leave failed states close to where we found them to justify the 
colossal expense of engaging in state-building. Whether it is possible or desirable to 
impart western institutions to the failed states of the world is an open question and one 
that should be investigated. After all, is it not hoping for too much to drop western liberal 
democracy on societies that do not share the Christian and classical origins of this 
particular type of regime and expect them to succeed? The problem is not whether the 
populations of failed states can adopt institutions that developed out of a classical and 
Christian historical narrative, it is to what extent these institutions may conflict with that 
beliefs and identity that the populations of those states already possess.  
If the answer is that they cannot, then the new state, supported by western liberal-
democratic sovereignty will not be able to acquire legitimacy and authority. The idea of a 
secular centralized and democratic state may be offensive to some cultures living in 
failed states; indeed, the attempt to institute them in the past may have contributed to 
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their failure in the first place. Problems arise when modern ‘nation’-states attempt to 
intervene in other countries, particularly former colonies, and expect that political 
institutions will reshape the population into being more a cohesive nation. Nation-
building, presumably, involves the building of a single ethnicity/race/etc. In reality, this 
cannot happen without replicating the purges that Hitler or Stalin carried out among 
certain ethnic/racial groups within their territories. What the French did after the 
revolution was educate the people toward embracing an artificial common identity. But 
this identity is itself artificial and there is always the threat that ethnicity will return as the 
dominant category of social interactions. The evolution of nationalism as a modern 
source of legitimacy is an extremely convoluted and mysterious process involving 
symbols and in many ways it is indicative of religion. This dogmatic attention to symbols 
and shared belief that is at the heart of co-opting a diverse population into a ‘nation’, it is 
a visceral emotional thing, you cannot force it upon a population. Institutions do not 
engender nationalism; instead it is nationalism that creates the institutions. You cannot 
institutionally force people to share a common identity in the short run, though education 
does seem to maintain it over the long run. The reason it is difficult to instill identity 
when state-building is because identity tends to be formed against something. The only 
way an outsider can do it is by being the opposition of the entire populace. But this is 
outrageous because no state would be willing to go to war and commit atrocities just so a 
failed state can become strong. Indeed, it is a bad idea since that strong state is likely to 
remember the favor in the future.  
It is much more efficient for a state-builder to look to the identities already 
present within a failed state, ones that are forming in opposition to one another. We are 
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defined by what we resist, the struggle gives us identity and this is the surest and 
strongest rallying point for authority. However, in light of humanitarian and security 
concerns it is no longer possible to allow this drawn out process of identity formation to 
occur; it must be sped along. Since there are competing identities already within failed 
states, it may be safer and cheaper to encourage their realization into new state 
institutions. If an umbrella of security is maintained, then these groups will find alternate 
ways to forge their identity, through the differentiation of customs and dialect, through 
sports competitions and education. Once smaller states, more homogenous in terms of 
their shared identities are formed, they will be much more likely to identify with their 
institutions and legitimate them. There is a reason that few city-states tend to succeed. A 
city-state is small enough that the population is able to identify with and grant legitimacy 
to their institutions, and they are maintained because when there is the persistent 
existential threat of assimilation. Few would look at Hong Kong or Singapore today and 
see these as failed states. Singapore will not fade because the people have an identity that 
is not shared with mainland Malaysia, so too is the case between Hong Kong and China. 
It seems that the more threatened a polity feels, the more its members seek solidarity and 
share their identification with one another and institutions they deem legitimate.  
We can now see that the modern state that is typically called the ‘nation’-state is 
more akin to an empire than an internally homogenous ‘nation.’ It is almost always multi-
ethnic and serious threats made at the unity undergirding state institutions are likely to be 
resisted through force. Unlike the empires of old which dominated other ethnic groups 
through military means, this is a soft-imperialism in that it consists primarily of ideas. 
The idea of a shared identity is a powerful tool for keeping a territorially extended state 
 Holland 32	  
together, but in few cases is there really an ethnic group so large. The classical, Christian, 
and early modern political developments of Europe tend to be viewed as the starting point 
for what state-building should seek to achieve: institutionally strong liberal-democratic 
states. However, these may antagonize a population rather than ally its identity into 
supporting its own state institutions. It is much more efficient to take advantage of the 
identities already present on the ground. This may involve partitioning a country into 
small, relatively weak states and maintaining sufficient international force in the area to 
prevent predation between each successor state. However, this is cheaper and more 
feasible than trying to create a unitary regime with western institutions in most cases. 
Smaller regimes, when threatened existentially from the outside, tend to focus their 
resources on solidarity and creating a sense of unity within the population. Since 
nationalism involves the suppression of other ethnic groups and their subsequent 
forgetting of that suppression, nationalism should not be seen as a useful tool for state 
building in most cases. In the following chapter we move on to a closer study of identity 
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CHAPTER THREE: STRUCTURAL SOLUTIONS TO STATE FAILURE 
The Charter of the United Nations acknowledges the right of all peoples to ‘self-
determination.’83 This sentiment is reflected in both the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which state that “all peoples have the right of self-
determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”84,85 There are, however, many 
populations around the world are denied the realization of this right. These populations 
have, by chance, ended up sharing a state with other groups they have may have little or 
no identification with. The borders of these states are in most cases the product of 
colonialism and reflect the dynamics of force and diplomacy between European powers – 
many of which no longer exist. But these states do not reap the benefits of their diversity 
in the form of constitutional pluralism. Conversely, the populations tend toward sectarian 
and ethnic atomism, resulting in conflict between identity groups. None of these groups 
are cohesive enough that, should they comprise nearly all of the population, they would 
be able to hold their own identity group together without it fragmenting into smaller units. 
Such conflict and instability is a major source of international insecurity and, therefore, 
the main impetus for state-building. 
Why are these states together if their populations do not want to be? The answer 
lies in the system of state sovereignty. When the world began its rapid decolonization in 
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the decades following the Second World War, the principle of uti possidetis juris 
maintained the colonial administrative borders of these territories as a matter of sovereign 
right. This principle derives from the Latin phrase “’uti possidetis, ita possideatis,’ or as 
you possess, so may you possess.”86 It was a matter of international courtesy to grant 
these states sovereignty intact, but it failed to realize that the ethnic and sectarian 
conflicts within these territories would keep them from developing. As a result, today 
there are currently more than 59 active separatist movements around the world.87 It seems 
that those who ‘possess’ these territories are not necessarily the people who inhabit them, 
but whoever the strongest group or individual in the country is. So employed, sovereignty 
is a tool for oppression, perverting justice as criminals extract from their populations 
behind the veil of international law and the sanctity of the sovereign state. This is a recipe 
for permanent conflict, as well as the reason why so many post-colonial countries have 
had such a terrible record of development. The reason for this is that identities whose 
interests are an expression of the general will are not permitted to emerge, because the 
demographic and territorial distributions of the country are held sacrosanct. 
This is not to say that some states are not better off keeping the borders they 
currently have. Indeed, some peoples inhabit resource poor and landlocked countries that 
would benefit enormously with access to a common state market. What it does say is that 
state sovereignty as it is traditionally realized is the source of global insecurity and that it 
must be corrected if we are to fix the problem of failed-states. To illustrate the issue of 
territorial impregnability, we can look to the quintessential failed-state; Somalia. 
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Universally agreed to be a failed state, portions of this country, with a history that 
diverges from the rest of the country, like Somaliland and Puntland, are prevented from 
achieving de jure statehood even though they no longer desire to share a state with the 
remaining Somali’s to the south and east. The world accepts as semi-independent the 
territory of Somaliland, even though the people declared their own independence and 
have de facto maintained it since 1991.88 The central argument I have made so far is that 
it is only through recognition and incorporation of these emergent or pre-existing 
identities that a state-building project can be successful. State-builders should be seeking 
to reduce security threats posed against and this can only be achieved if the end result of 
the intervention is satisfactory for all identity groups within the new state(s). 
The remainder of this chapter will look at the two ways in which contemporary 
states are structured. All functional states have either federative or unitary constitutive 
structures. A state may have long established precedent rather than a formal constitution, 
but in will still have a constitutive structure. A federative structure exists when the core 
has encouraged or allowed administrative units to control and entrench certain state 
prerogatives. A unitary structure secures all final authority within the core. Neither of 
these systems, however, remain in stasis and pure. They are merely perspectives that 
actors within states take toward the allocation of authority both in constitution and actual 
practice. Over time, federative and unitary structures interpenetrate one another. The 
Delian league began as a confederacy but ended with power centralized at Athens. The 
same was true with the Peloponnesian League and Sparta. The United States began 
originally structured as a confederacy, but with the constitution it became a federation 
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and, since the end of the civil war, there has been a trend toward greater centralization of 
power within the Federal level with less derogated to the states. The vehicle for this has 
typically been the commerce or ‘elastic clause.’ A similar situation has occurred in 
Germany where the Länder have become increasingly administrative in scope and 
subordinate to an increasingly unitary central government.89 The same holds true with 
unitary states. Due primarily to the problems of increasing scope and the misreporting of 
information at the lower levels, unitary structures tend to derogate, or ‘decentralize,’ their 
powers to lower administrative units over time. 
Neither of these shifts in authority distribution require constitutional changes, 
unless a population has been under self-rule for such an extent of time that it see’s little 
need for the center anymore. This interpenetration is also fluid as the policy prerogatives 
that the core and periphery have change depending on the expedients facing the political 
structure. While not as efficient as a deliberate strategy, such as employing the principle 
of subsidiarity, states will naturally approach such a distribution of power between the 
highest and lowest administrative units over time that encourages stability and prosperity. 
Moreover, federative and unitary structures can exist in both institutional and territorial 
dimensions. For example, consociationalism is a federative structure that is divorced 
from territory and exists solely in the relations between social groups.90 Consociational 
institutions will tie groups together regardless of what territory they occupy. However, in 
failed states, territoriality is more important because of the need to establish authority. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Michael Burgess and Franz Gross, “The Quest for a Federal Future: German Unity and Federation,” in 
Comparative Federalism and Federation, ed. Michael Burgess and Alain-G. Gagnon (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1993), 175.	  
90  Bernard J.S. Hoetjes, “The European Tradition of Federalism: The Protestant Dimension,” in 
Comparative Federalism and Federation, ed. Michael Burgess and Alain-G. Gagnon (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1993), 131.  
 Holland 37	  
Having consociational institutions overlap with the territorial structure is useful in 
democracies, but not in circumstances where no authority has achieved legitimacy in the 
people’s eyes. Achieving territoriality in failed states will in most cases require an 
alignment of territory with social groups; this means that in some cases legitimacy may 
only be achieved through partition. However, partitioned states will in turn have to 
become federative or unitary when they are established. An alternative way of 
envisioning these two systems is as either M- or U-type structures. First we will examine 
the U-type or unitary structure.91 
 
3.1 – Unitary States 
 We begin with the most proliferate constitutive structure in the world today, the 
unitary state. Most of the 193 states in the world can be classified as unitary regimes. A 
unitary regime is one that seeks to centralize decision-making as a principle. One of the 
benefits of such a system is that it can be highly efficient. When all decisions come from 
one source, they are highly uniform and this yields advantages in commerce because all 
laws and infrastructure will be the same everywhere in the state. Moreover, a unitary 
government minimizes the duplication of services that accompanies having multiple tiers 
of government with institutions operating semi-independently as they do in a federative 
system. By avoiding the duplication of services, a unitary state structure can achieve the 
same results with a much smaller bureaucracy. Additionally, unitary regimes are in a 
much better position to overcome parochial biases. Because the core must aim its policies 
at universality, it is usually the level of government that turns over social institutions that 
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are unjust.92 To use the US as an example, states did work to undue the social injustices 
of our society, but the actual abolition of slavery, the granting of universal suffrage, and 
the desegregating schools would never have occurred had the central government not 
usurped the rights of states. If something is determined unjust for society as a whole, the 
core can intervene directly in the periphery. 
However, the distance in time and space between events in the periphery and the 
core are one of the weaknesses of unitary regimes. To overcome the blindness that the 
core may experience vis-à-vis the periphery, the central government is likely to 
decentralize some of its tasks to lower administrative units. These units, being closer to 
the actual events and locals that policy must be conducted in, have access to real-time 
information that the center cannot always have. In this way problems like misreporting 
inefficiencies can be uncovered. Authority, however, is still held within the central 
government which has the right to take away the powers it grants to lesser administrative 
units. One means of decentralizing is through the principle of subsidiarity. First 
articulated by Pope Pius XI, it stipulates that decisions should be delegated to the lowest 
administrative level capable of carrying them out efficiently and completely.93 However, 
some of the disadvantages that plague unitary state cannot be overcome so easily. With a 
highly centralized system, the possibility of majority tyranny increases. A good 
constitution will provide checks on power to safeguard this, but there is no constitutional 
limit on the center in relation to the sub-state units. As a result, many disasters can befall 
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minority groups who are seen as nonconformist or subversive. The power of the central 
government to intervene and stop unjust social practices in the states requires that the 
center espouse pluralist policies. This has worked in countries like France with court’s 
ruling in favor of minority Muslims during that country’s multiple scandals involving 
girls wearing the hijab to school.94 However, history is replete with cases where unitary 
states did nothing to intervene or actually encouraged attacks on minorities, as was the 
case in both Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union. 
In regards to failed states, unitary regimes are not usually the best option. Among 
their advantages is the ability to create uniform laws and institutions across the country. 
Additionally, they can select administrators from the entire country’s elite who are best 
qualified and place them in periphery posts to aid in there development. However, given 
that the identities within these countries are likely to be divergent, a unitary regime will 
lose legitimacy as different groups perceive it as distant and favoring one group over the 
other. This problem is exacerbated if the state is large and multi-national. A unitary 
regime is a good option for failed states that are homogenous and preferably small. City-
states are primary candidates for unitary government because the geographical closeness 
of the population to the center of power allows for quicker legitimacy acquisition than 
when the state is far away and its reach, abstract. Another important factor is literacy. If a 
state has low literacy rates and no access to contemporary media technologies, then no 
democracy can exist. Democracy requires a public space where open debate can occur. 
When the greatest issues of importance are local and there is no means of getting 
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information accept in face to face interactions with other locals, then the public airing of 
ideas between people of different beliefs and different parts of the territory cannot occur. 
Unitary regimes that do not have to rely on oppression, seem to be successful in 
regions where the population is either homogenous, or where the state has been free from 
failure for long enough that a literate middle-class has developed and a public sphere has 
formed. Prior to this, it makes sense for unitary regimes to be authoritarian because the 
center must have the coercive power to do what it must in the periphery, since the people 
there will not have a firm grip on the state of the country as a whole (again, unless the 
country is very small). Overall, the opportunity for abuse in encouraging a unitary regime 
seems too great for failed states. The population is likely to be locally focused and as 
such, will leave the core to elites who may not be representative of all the country’s 
ethnic or sectarian groups. Unitary structures may be of more use at the local level, but 
not as a country-wide system, at least not until the passing of time has allowed old 
wounds to heal and new associations between groups to be made. Failed states are almost 
always in a state of domestic anarchy and the preying of one group upon another does 
much to eliminate trust between them. It is for this reason that it is impractical to set up a 
unitary state in countries like Bosnia after the Yugoslav wide civil war of the 1990s. In 
such circumstances, federative structures offer better opportunities to achieve stability 
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3.2 – Federal States 
Federal structures are very different from both the M- form and U- form types of 
governance.95 This is because they are by nature decentralized and there are various ways 
in which a state can distribute authority. A unitary state can only distribute authority from 
the top-down. Federalism can be broadly divided between symmetrical federalism, 
asymmetrical federalism, and confederacy. A confederacy is a federation in which the 
constitutive units retain all by a few powers. Essentially, the units of a confederacy are 
federal or unitary states themselves that have entered into an agreement to share certain 
institutions of government between them. A federation can be described as a unitary state 
that has employed the principles of confederation on itself. The units below the central 
government have constitutionally entrenched powers that the central government cannot 
arbitrarily take away.96 Among the benefits of constitutional entrenchment of lesser 
administrative units are the advantages of pluralism. Pluralist systems are a divide and 
rule method that seeks to multiply the factions within a state so that the only means of 
accomplishing goals are through cooperation, toleration and respect.97 This means that 
the different peoples who form a state together have a sort of unity that comes out of 
“organized diversity,” allowing for greater “freedom and efficacy than centralized empire, 
or the chaos of unconnected actors.”98  
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Some scholars such as Yingyi Qian and Barry Weingast point to the economic 
advantages that constitutional division of authority allows for. 99  Entrenched 
decentralization means that decisions are made closer to local sources of information, 
making the decisions made more responsive to prevailing local conditions and changes in 
the local socio-economic environment.100 However, Fukuyama points out that this can be 
a double-edged sword as both Argentina and Brazil have been led to budget deficits by 
fiscal federalism.101 Moreover, the advantages of pluralism cannot be reaped without a 
constitutionally protected federal structure.102 Overall, however, federalism has proven to 
be an exceptional system at sustaining economic growth and stability. The few 
drawbacks that this structure does have are duplication of services and the inability of 
lower administrative units to initiate radical social change which may be necessary for 
the survival of the system. It is in these instances that a good constitution will allow the 
central power of the federation to step in and act as a facilitator for change. This system, 
however, also has certain problems when it is placed in a failed-state context. 
Since group identities in failed states can be outright hostile to one another, there 
is no guarantee that states will not simply secede or enter into civil war when no 
compromises are reached. Compromises entail a spirit of cooperation or, at the very least, 
a willingness to accept state authority when things do not go the way of your group.  
When people are not convinced that their group is being adequately represented, they 
may feel alienated by this system and try to exit. This can create a whole new cycle of 
conflict within the state. One solution to federation is to make it asymmetrical, that is, for 
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different constitutive units to have various degrees of autonomy vis-à-vis the core. The 
US is an example of a symmetrical federation. Each state has the same rights as all of the 
others and one can simply move from one to the other without any problems since they 
are all administratively unified. In an asymmetrical relationship, one state may have 
partial to nearly complete autonomy as compared to the other units. This enables an 
identity group to test the waters so to speak before having to jump in. There are powerful 
economic incentives that discourage a state from secession, in particular the open access 
to a free market. Seceding is not always the best option for a people to take as they are 
depriving themselves of the public goods a larger state can offer, especially security. 
While these states have many advantages that enable them to effectively acquire authority 
in failed states, they are not always ideal because both symmetrical and asymmetrical 
federalism may not give the desired freedom and autonomy to divergent identity groups. 
This makes federacy and partitions the most useful structural solutions for state-builders 
to mediate the problem of identity conflict within a given territory. 
 
3.3 – Partition and Federacy 
 Federacy should be discussed apart from federation because it really is a unique 
political structure. A federacy is not merely a federal state because it can be the only such 
relationship in an otherwise unitary state. Nor is it a confederacy arrangement because a 
confederacy requires that both parties enter into the relationship as equals.103 Instead, a 
federacy is an arrangement that can exist between any state structure, federative or 
unitary and a territorial region. One way to define the federacy is as a halfway point 
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toward full incorporation into a central state, a stop on the way to independence, or a 
permanent arrangement in which both parties gain substantially. As noted before, the 
federacy tends toward the third example as federacies gain substantial advantages that 
prevent them from seceding and their entrenchment in the system makes it very difficult 
for the core state to take powers away from them. Federacy is the ideal structural solution 
for failed states because it can sidestep the primary cause of conflict between identity 
groups in these states – access to scarce resources. Therefore, this solution gives two or 
more peoples a political vehicle through which to express their group identities in such a 
way that legitimizes institutional authority, yet avoids conflict. In the case of Iraq, the 
decision of the Kurds to remain a part of that country instead of seceding during the 
American occupation greatly improved the potential of the new Iraq to succeed. One day 
the Kurds may well decide that they no longer want to be part of this country, but in the 
meantime, they bring a constitutionally defensible plurality to what may otherwise be a 
regime that on way back to tyranny. The Kurds in turn retain all the advantages of being 
Iraqi just as they have gained real powers of self-determination.104  
 The federacy is as unique an arrangement as it is a successful one. There are many 
federacies in the world, over 60 being constituted since the nineteenth century, most of 
which have been highly successful.105  The Protections that such polities enjoy depends 
on their relationship to the central government. In states that do not have strong 
constitutional protections, federacy’s can use the stability they provide to maintain their 
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autonomy. Such is the case with Hong Kong, which has maintained its autonomy vis-à-
vis the People’s Republic of China because it provides that country with an enormous 
reservoir of capital to sustain growth, in short, their autonomy is secured not so much 
through constitutional entrenchment as through the political-economic incentives that it 
brings to the Chinese government not to encroach into Hong Kong affairs.106 Due to these 
advantages for satisfying all parties involved, the federacy should be pursued as the ideal 
way to resolve endemic identity conflicts within failed states. The opportunity to express 
this identity within semi-autonomous spheres of influence can stay the tide toward 
secession movements and civil war that would otherwise throw the country into chaos.  
 One situation exists in which federacy cannot be justifiably maintained. Once a 
state-builder has established a blanket of security, identified the various group identities 
among the populace and encouraged institutional formation, the population may decide 
that they do not want to remain in the same country as the other groups and wish to form 
their own state. In this context, the only justifiable course is partition and it is incumbent 
upon the state-builder to prevent recidivism and a reemergence of conflicts between the 
new sovereign entity and those that have chosen to remain together. Partition, long 
vilified as something empires inflicted on the rest of the world, is also a legitimate means 
for group identities to emerge from a context in which they do not feel federacy can 
provide them with the security and assurances they require. That being said, partition will 
always be bloody and involve an increased security presence to stave off nationalist 
attacks on minorities as populations transfer to either side of the new international 
boundary.  
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CONCLUSION 
Although partition and federacy approach the issue of giving voice to group 
identities from very different angles, they are both successful means of doing so. The 
main difference between the two is that federacy attempts to do so in a way that is not 
traditional for sovereignty, but dividing it up between different units within a core state’s 
territory. Partition is the more traditional solution of trying to give different identities 
voice by separating them into independent sovereign states. Neither option should be 
treated as a cure-all since they have different circumstances under which they are ideally 
employed. However, since the ultimate purpose is the establishment of lasting security 
within the sovereignty vacuum posed by state-failure by eliminating the ethnic and 
sectarian identities that tend to clash, both options should be pursued as the primary 
structural goals of state-builders. Unitary and federal regimes have their place in 
development but should not be held in high regards for most failed states. Therefore, 
future state-building operations in the context of failed states after military intervention, 
should first seek to establish security and identify the primary group identities among the 
population. Secondly it should foster these identities to build up institutions that the 
population can identify with. Lastly, it should encourage the writing of a constitution that 
provides partial-autonomy for divergent identities if they wish to remain in the same state. 
If not, then a state-builder should carry out partition in accordance with the desires of the 
people. 
 As we have seen, the sovereign state is a very peculiar thing with a long and 
varied history. From its emergence in early modern Europe to today, it has proved highly 
adaptive to an ever-changing world and it would be wrong to assume that its days are 
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numbered. However, as adaptive as state sovereignty is, it has consistently failed to 
protect the smallest of political groups and does not work equally well in every cultural 
context. To aid in the process of state-building and giving voice to group identities, it 
may eventually be reevaluate the role state sovereignty plays in the international system. 
As articulated above, state sovereignty was originally predicated on a system of unitary, 
absolutist principalities. Few states in the world bear a resemblance to this early-modern 
political context. Indeed the opposite appears to be the case as state sovereignty is being 
stretched upwards to international and supranational entities and downwards to local 
decentralized powers. What we may see in the future is a sovereign system that more 
closely resembles the Holy Roman Empire than the age of absolutism.  
As we progress into the 21st century, we should embrace the evolution of state 
sovereignty. The potential that an increasingly fragmented world has for diversity may 
actually make the world more peaceful as smaller groups are able to formulate 
institutions they can identify with. In this paper, I have tried to show how identity is the 
source of legitimacy for political institutions and how this legitimacy can best be 
incorporated into the state-building process through federacy and, as a last resort, 
partition. As a point of caution, state-builders are advised to not be overly ambitious and 
remember that we are all trapped by the historicity of our situation. Sovereignty has 
evolved from divine right of the king’s person to an abstract idea of authority emanating 
from the body politic. Whatever the future may hold for state-building, it will be 
necessary for sovereign states to act in their own interest and guard against the security 
threats endemic to failed states. If we are fortunate, state-building will mature as a 
science to the point where we can reliably meet both humanitarian and security ends. 
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